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The Problem of the "Un-omitted" Spouse
Under Section 2-301 of the Uniform
Probate Code
When a testator marries after the execution of his will and
then dies without amending his will to include a gift for his new
spouse, two different inferences are possible. He may simply have
forgotten to change his will, or he may have intended to omit his
surviving spouse.' Although it is a truism of probate law that
courts cannot make wills for people,2 courts faced with the omit-
ted-spouse problem have found it necessary to circumvent this in-
terdiction: in order to prevent the unintentional disinheritance of
the surviving spouse, courts have developed the doctrine of implied
revocation by change in domestic circumstances. This doctrine al-
lows a court to revoke an antenuptial will, either entirely or in
part, in order to give a share of the estate to the surviving spouse.'
Section 2-301 of the Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C. or the Code)
codifies a version of this rule.4 Under section 2-301, a surviving
spouse who married the testator after his will was executed and is
not "provided for" in his will is entitled to receive an intestate
share of the estate,5 unless the testator either expressly disinher-
See M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 267-68 (1971).
' See 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 30.7, at 40 (rev. ed. 1961).
3 See, e.g., THOMAS ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 85 (2d ed. 1953); 2 W.
BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 2, § 21.86. Both the common law doctrine of implied revoca-
tion by change in domestic circumstances and modern omitted-spouse statutes are discussed
infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
4 UNI'. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a) (1983) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as
U.P.C.] provides:
If a testator fails to provide by will for his surviving spouse who married the testa-
tor after the execution of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of
the estate he would have received if the decedent left no will unless it appears from the
will that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for the spouse by trans-
fer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provi-
sion is shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of the transfer or other
evidence.
At least 14 states have adopted the U.P.C. in its entirety. See 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983).
' The omitted spouse's intestate share is described in U.P.C. § 2-102:
(1) if there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the entire intestate
estate;
(2) if there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by a parent or par-
ents, the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate;
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ited the spouse in the will or made an extratestamentary provision
for the spouse that he intended to be in lieu of a provision by will.
This comment discusses the circumstances in which a surviv-
ing spouse who is a beneficiary of an antenuptial will (the "men-
tioned" spouse) has been "provided for" within the meaning of
section 2-301. In the more common case, where an antenuptial will
makes no mention of the surviving spouse, section 2-301 presumes
that the surviving spouse has been omitted because the testator
forgot to revise his will before his death.' Where the antenuptial
will does contain a devise7 to the surviving spouse, however, it is
more troublesome to presume that the testator unintentionally
failed to increase the devise in light of the change in his personal
life.
Two state supreme courts have considered the problem of ap-
plying section 2-301 (or an omitted-spouse statute modeled on that
provision) when the petitioning spouse is a beneficiary of the ante-
nuptial will. In Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier,8 the Florida
Supreme Court held that a surviving spouse has not been "pro-
vided for" within the meaning of the omitted-spouse statute, even
though the antenuptial will contains a provision for him, unless the
testator executed the antenuptial devise in contemplation of mar-
(3) if there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving spouse also,
the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate;
(4) if there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of the surviving
spouse, one-half of the intestate estate.
Section 3-902 describes the abatement of the will's provisions necessitated by the spouse
taking an intestate share. Id. § 3-902.
If a surviving spouse is not covered by section 2-301, he may choose to renounce the will
and take an elective share of one-third of the "augmented estate" under section 2-201. Id.
§ 2-201(a). The "augmented estate" is defined generally to include the decedent's net pro-
bate estate increased by (1) the value of certain lifetime transfers of property by the dece-
dent during marriage to donees other than the surviving spouse, id. § 2-202(1); and (2) the
value of all property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death and certain
lifetime transfers of property by the surviving spouse during marriage to donees other than
the decedent, to the extent that the owned or transferred property is derived from the dece-
dent, id. § 2-202(2). For detailed descriptions of the Code's elective-share provisions, see
Kossow, Probate Law and the Uniform Code: "One for the Money", 61 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1388-
93 (1973); Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In
Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 1011-61 (1977).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
7 Traditionally, the term "devise" referred to a testamentary transfer of real property,
and the term "bequest" referred to a testamentary transfer of personal property. See J.
DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 36 (3d ed. 1984). Within the Code,
however, the word "devise" is defined to include both kinds of transfers. U.P.C. § 1-201(7).
This comment follows the Code's usage.
8 418 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1982).
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riage to that person.9 The Utah Supreme Court, in Estate of Chris-
tensen v. Christensen,0 refused to read a contemplation-of-mar-
riage requirement into section 2-301 and instead concluded that
the petitioning spouse mentioned in an antenuptial will has the
burden of showing that the devise "could not reasonably represent
th[e] testator's effort 'to provide by will for his surviving
spouse.' "I'
Part I of this comment first examines the common law and
statutory treatment of the problem of the surviving spouse who
was "mentioned" in an antenuptial will and then examines current
interpretations of section 2-301. Part II analyzes section 2-301 and
other provisions of the Code in order to determine the appropriate
treatment of "mentioned" spouses under section 2-301. The com-
ment argues that because section 2-301 is a gap-filling rule
designed to effectuate the testator's probable intent, courts should
focus on whether the testator in fact considered the relationship
between his marriage and his old will and intended his surviving
spouse to receive only what was devised in the antenuptial will.
Part III proposes procedural standards to be used in implementing
this "testator's intent" approach. Through proper allocation of the
burden of proof, probate courts will be able to handle most "men-
tion cases" quickly and efficiently. For the small class of cases in
which the application of this approach would require courts to con-
sider evidence extrinsic to the will, the comment recommends the
admission of such evidence (under a clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard) when it is relevant to the inquiry into the testator's
intent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Common Law and Statutory Treatment of Omitted Spouses
At common law, a woman's marriage revoked her antenuptial
will under the general rule that married women lacked testamen-
tary capacity.2 A man's antenuptial will, however, was revoked
only by the birth of legitimate issue; the wife was not an heir of
her husband (and therefore could not benefit from revocation) and
9 Id. at 260.
10 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982).
1 Id. at 649-50 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-301 (1978), which is essentially identi-
cal to U.P.C. § 2-301).
1" See T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 85, at 426; M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra
note 1, at 268-69.
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had her right to dower regardless of what the will provided.13 In
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there was considera-
ble controversy over the theoretical justification for the doctrine of
implied revocation by change in domestic circumstances.14 The ec-
clesiastical courtsi5 and some common law judges 6 held that this
doctrine created a rebuttable presumption of revocation; the pre-
sumption was raised on the theory that the testator would have
wanted his will to be revoked where there had been a change in his
domestic circumstances. These courts would admit extrinsic evi-
dence to rebut the presumption of revocation. 7 Most common law
courts, however, concluded that the implied-revocation doctrine
was an irrebuttable rule of law, which operated regardless of the
testator's intent, because of a "tacit condition annexed to the will
itself at the time of making it, that the [testator] does not then
intend that it should take effect if there should be a total change
in the situation of his family."'" By the mid-nineteenth century,
the English courts were in agreement on the latter approach and
held that the will was revoked regardless of the testator's intent.19
Modern omitted-spouse statutes have modified the common
law doctrine in several respects.2 0 Perhaps the most significant
3 See T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 85, at 424, 428-29; M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON,
supra note 1, at 269.
14 See R WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, PALMER'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 261 (4th ed. 1983); Graunke & Beuscher, The Doctrine of Implied
Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change in Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5 Wis. L.
REV. 387, 393-94 (1930).
15 See, e.g., Fox v. Marston, 1 Curteis Eccl. Rep. 494, 499, 505 (Prerog. Ct. Canterbury
1837); Johnson v. Wells, 2 Haggard Eccl. Rep. 561, 564 (Prerog. Ct. Canterbury 1829); Tal-
bot v. Talbot, 1 Haggard Eccl. Rep. 705, 711 (Prerog. Ct. Canterbury 1828).
16 Lord Mansfield and Lord Buller adopted the position that the presumption of revo-
cation is rebuttable, see Brady v. Cubitt, 1 Dougl. 31, 39 (K.B. 1778), but Lord Buller later
abandoned this approach, see Doe v. Lancashire, 5 T.R. 49, 61, 101 Eng. Rep. 28, 35-36
(K.B. 1792) ("I entirely concur with my Lord [Kenyon] that no regard is to be paid [to the
declarations of the testator].").
27 See, e.g., Brady v. Cubitt, 1 Dougl. 31, 39-39a (K.B. 1778); Graunke & Beuscher,
supra note 14, at 393.
'a Doe v. Lancashire, 5 T.R. 49, 58, 101 Eng. Rep. 28, 34 (K.B. 1792) (Lord Kenyon,
C.J.); see also Marston v. Roe, 8 Ad. & E. 14, 60, 112 Eng. Rep. 742, 758 (Ex. Ch. 1838)
(Tindal, C.J.) ("the law annexes the tacit condition that subsequent marriage and the birth
of a child operates as a revocation"); Doe, 5 T.R. at 63, 101 Eng. Rep. at 36-37 (Grose, J.)
("The law presumes that . . . there was a tacit condition annexed to the will, that in [the
event of marriage and the subsequent birth of a child] the will should not stand.").
19 See, e.g., Israell v. Rodon, 2 Moore 51, 63-64, 12 Eng. Rep. 922, 926-27 (P.C. 1839);
Walker v. Walker, 2 Curteis Eccl. Rep. 854, 854-55 (Prerog. Ct. Canterbury 1841).
11 For example, the current rule is that marriage alone may be sufficient to revoke the
will of either a man or a woman. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6560 (West Supp. 1985); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 732.301 (West Supp. 1984); cf. U.P.C. § 2-301(a) (intestate share may be
awarded where a surviving spouse married the testator after the execution of the latter's
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change is that the irrebuttable presumption of revocation, trig-
gered by the testator's marriage after the execution of his will, has
been replaced by a revocation that operates in more limited cir-
cumstances.21 The elimination of the irrebuttable presumption
forced courts to reexamine the theoretical basis for the presump-
tion of revocation so that they could ascertain the circumstances in
which the presumption could be rebutted.
In addressing the special problem of surviving spouses who
had received devises in antenuptial wills, most courts have con-
cluded that the proper inquiry under pre-Code omitted-spouse
statutes is whether the antenuptial will was executed in contem-
plation of marriage.2 Two different rationales have been offered
for this test. California courts have reasoned that by ensuring that
the testator, in executing his will, considered the surviving spouse
as a spouse, the contemplation-of-marriage requirement advances
what they have considered to be the primary purpose of omitted-
spouse statutes: the protection of the surviving spouse .2  An alter-
will). Some jurisdictions have also concluded that the antenuptial will is not revoked en-
tirely, but only as it affects the share of the estate going to the surviving spouse. See, e.g.,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6560 (West Supp. 1985); cf. U.P.C. § 2-301(a) (where the testator fails to
provide for a surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution of the latter's
will, "the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the estate he would have received if
the decedent left no will").
21 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.301 (West Supp. 1984) (no revocation if provision has
been made for, or waived by, the spouse by prenuptial or postnuptial agreement, or if the
spouse is provided for in the will, or if the will shows an intent not to provide for the
spouse); cf. U.P.C. § 2-301(a) (no award of the intestate share if the will shows an intent not
to provide for the spouse, or if the spouse is provided for by extratestamentary transfer
intended to replace a devise).
22 See, e.g., Estate of Poisl, 44 Cal. 2d 147, 149-50, 280 P.2d 789, 791-92 (1955); In re
Estate of Day, 7 Ill. 2d 348, 354-55, 131 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1955); In re Estate of Mosher, 143
Misc. 149, 156-57, 256 N.Y.S. 235, 245 (Sur. Ct. 1932). A few states have statutes that ex-
pressly adopt the contemplation-of-marriage requirement. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-76
(1982).
23 See Estate of Poisl, 44 Cal. 2d 147, 149, 280 P.2d 789, 791-92 (1955); see also In re
Estate of Murray, 145 Cal. App. 3d 324, 327, 193 Cal. Rptr. 355, 356 (1983) (the omitted-
spouse statute "reflects a strong public policy against disinheritance of a surviving spouse,
who is not provided for in the premarital will of the testator.") (citation omitted). Some
courts and commentators, however, have argued that the purpose of omitted-spouse statutes
is not to protect the surviving spouse contrary to the testator's intent, but rather to revoke
the will if the testator unintentionally failed to provide for the surviving spouse. See, e.g.,
Czepiel v. Czepiel, 146 Conn. 439, 442, 151 A.2d 878, 880 (1959) (purpose is not to ensure
adequate provision for surviving spouse, but to ensure that contingency of marriage was not
overlooked); Comment, In re Estate of Christensen: Utah Rejects Contemplation of Mar-
riage Standard in Omitted Spouse Cases, 1983 UTAH L. Rav. 861, 863-64 (same). This com-
ment will argue that section 2-301 is a rule of construction designed to implement the testa-
tor's probable intent, not a rule of law that operates regardless of his actual intent. See infra
notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
1985]
The University of Chicago Law Review
native rationale, adopted by New York courts, relies on an im-
puted-intent theory similar to the one proposed by the old ecclesi-
astical courts:2 4 if there has been a major change in the testator's
domestic circumstances, he would have intended for his will to be
revoked unless he had executed his will in contemplation of
marriage."
Some courts have rejected the contemplation-of-marriage re-
quirement altogether and have instead adopted a narrow construc-
tion of omitted-spouse statutes.26 Under this approach, a surviving
spouse is considered to have been "provided for" within the mean-
ing of the omitted-spouse statute whenever the antenuptial will
contains a devise to him.2 7 Although these courts have not articu-
lated a clear rationale for this test, it is apparently based on the
view that because omitted-spouse statutes restrict testamentary
freedom, they should be narrowly construed.2
B. Current Interpretations of Section 2-301
Section 2-301 differs from the common law and some other
omitted-spouse statutes in several respects. The most important
among these is that section 2-301 creates a rule according to which
the surviving spouse receives the intestate share only if he marries
the testator after the execution of a will that does not "provide
24 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., In re Simon, 232 A.D. 214, 215, 249 N.Y.S. 683, 685-86, aff'd mem. sub nom.
In re Reiss, 257 N.Y. 539, 178 N.E. 785 (1931); In re Estate of Mosher, 143 Misc. 149, 152,
256 N.Y.S. 235, 239 (Sur. Ct. 1932). In 1967, New York repealed its omitted-spouse provi-
sion for all wills executed after September 1, 1930. A surviving spouse, however, may still
renounce the will and take a one-third elective share of the probate estate. See N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-1.1(a), 5-1.3(a) (McKinney 1981). All spouses claiming to be
omitted from wills executed before September 1, 1930, will receive the intestate share "un-
less provision was made for the surviving spouse by antenuptial agreement in writing." Id.
§ 5-1.3(a).
26 See In re Estate of Appenfelder, 99 Cal. App. 330, 335, 278 P. 473, 476 (1929), over-
ruled, Estate of Poisl, 44 Cal. 2d 147, 150, 280 P.2d 789, 792 (1955); In re Estate of Steele,
45 Wash. 2d 58, 61, 273 P.2d 235, 236 (1954).
27 See In re Estate of Appenfelder, 99 Cal. App. 330, 333, 278 P. 473, 474-76 (1929),
overruled, Estate of Poisl, 44 Cal. 2d 147, 150, 280 P.2d 789, 792 (1955); In re Estate of
Steele, 45 Wash. 2d 58, 61, 273 P.2d 235, 236 (1954).
28 Cf. In re Estate of Adler, 52 Wash. 539, 548-49, 100 P. 1019, 1023 (1909) ("[T]he
grounds upon which wills are or may be revoked are statutory, [but] it is also the rule that
revocation of wills by implication of law are not favored."); Estate of Ganier, 402 So. 2d 418,
421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("[Omitted spouse statutes] are in derogation of the general
power to make a will and should be strictly construed. No exception should be extended to
include a class not clearly comprehended in the statute[s].") (citation omitted), rev'd sub
nom. Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1982).
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for" him. 29 As a result, courts have had to consider whether section
2-301 requires a special test for surviving spouses who received de-
vises in antenuptial wills.
1. The Contemplation-of-Marriage Requirement. In Estate
of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier,30 the Florida Supreme Court held
that an omitted-spouse statute modeled on section 2-301 included
the contemplation-of-marriage requirement, even though the stat-
ute did not expressly provide for it. 31 In Ganier, the testator,
Emma Kennedy, and the petitioner, Frederic Ganier, had been
close friends since 1973. In 1977, Mrs. Kennedy executed a will,
devising her bank accounts to Mr. Ganier and the residue of her
estate to relatives. The couple married in 1978, and Mrs. Kennedy
died six months later.32
In denying Mr. Ganier's claim for an intestate share under the
omitted-spouse statute, 33 the intermediate appellate court adopted
a narrow construction of the statute4.3  Because the statute neither
contains a contemplation-of-marriage standard nor explains how a
party might demonstrate that the antenuptial devise was executed
in contemplation of marriage, the court rejected Mr. Ganier's argu-
ment that a contemplation-of-marriage test should be read into the
statute.3 5 The court instead interpreted the statute literally and
held that any devise in the antenuptial will is sufficient to foreclose
2, U.P.C. § 2-301(a). Another respect in which section 2-301(a) differs is that, unlike the
common law and most omitted-spouse statutes, see R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROW-
DER, supra note 14, at 261-62, it does not revoke the entire will, but merely provides that the
surviving spouse is entitled to the intestate share, U.P.C. § 2-301(a).
30 418 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1982).
31 Id. at 260.
32 Id. at 257.
3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.301 (West Supp. 1984) provides:
When a person marries after making a will and the spouse survives the testator, the
surviving spouse shall receive a share in the estate of the testator equal in value to that
which the surviving spouse would have received if the testator had died intestate,
unless:
(1) Provision has been made for, or waived by, the spouse by prenuptial or post-
nuptial agreement;
(2) The spouse is provided for in the will; or
(3) The will discloses an intention not to make provision for the spouse.
Section 732.301, though not identical to U.P.C. § 2-301 (quoted supra note 4), is modeled on
that provision. See 8 U.LA 1 (1983). The only difference in wording that may affect the
outcome of a case relates to extratestamentary provision. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.301(1) (West Supp. 1984) (quoted supra) with U.P.C. § 2-301(a) (no omission if "the
testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer
be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown").
3' Estate of Ganier, 402 So. 2d 418, 420-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd sub nom.
Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1982).
35 Id. at 421 & n.3.
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an award of the intestate share. 6 The dissent argued that the ma-
jority's standard allowed a surviving spouse to be effectively disin-
herited by a minimal devise made in a will executed long before
marriage. 7 The court responded, however, that the statutory elec-
tive-share provision, 8 which allows any surviving spouse to reject
the testamentary devise and take a thirty-percent share of the net
estate,39 is the appropriate remedy for cases of "effective" disin-
heritance.40
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's nar-
row interpretation of the omitted-spouse statute and concluded
that the dispositive inquiry is whether the testator contemplated
marriage to the devisee at the time the will was executed. 41 The
court offered two arguments to support its interpretation of the
statute. First, after reviewing the statute's history, the court found
that the state legislature, in modifying the common law rule, had
not intended to "eliminat[e] the 'in contemplation of marriage' re-
quirement in circumstances where the will provides for the surviv-
ing spouse, but was not made with the understanding that it was
for the individual as a surviving spouse. '42 The court asserted that
the contemplation-of-marriage requirement is in fact codified in
the three statutory exceptions to the omitted-spouse statute: (1)
36 Id. at 420-21. A few courts have adopted a similar interpretation of other omitted-
spouse statutes. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
3' While it is true as the majority suggests, that [the omitted-spouse statute] prevents a
surviving spouse to whom a small bequest is given in the will from being "disinherited"
because he or she may choose to take an elective share, this is small consolation to the
spouse who would otherwise take the entire estate as would be the case where the
decedent had no lineal descendants.
Estate of Ganier, 402 So. 2d 418, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Upchurch, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted), rev'd sub nom. Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256 (Fla.
1982).
38 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.201 (West 1976).
39 The elective share shall consist of an amount equal to 30 percent of the fair market
value, on the date of death, of all assets referred to in [§] 732.206, computed after
deducting from the total value of the assets: (1) All valid claims against the estate paid
or payable from the estate; and (2) All mortgages, liens, or security interests on the
assets.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.207 (West Supp. 1984). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.206 (West 1976) pro-
vides that "[t]he elective share shall be computed by taking into account all property of the
decedent wherever located that is subject to administration except real property not located
in Florida." The U.P.C.'s electiVe-share provision, section 2-201, gives the surviving spouse
one-third of the probate estate, augmented by certain lifetime transfers of property by the
decedent. See supra note 5.
4E Estate of Ganier, 402 So. 2d 418, 421-22. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd sub nom.
Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1982).
41 Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256, 259-60 (Fla. 1982).
42 Id. at 258-59.
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where a marriage contract provides for the surviving spouse; (2)
where the antenuptial will provides for the spouse; or (3) where the
will expressly indicates that the testator did not intend to provide
for the spouse.43 Second, the court reasoned that the contempla-
tion-of-marriage requirement is consistent with what it considered
the primary purpose of the statute: to protect the surviving spouse
by "assur[ing] that the decedent spouse considered the surviving
spouse as a spouse when making his or her will.""'
In applying the contemplation-of-marriage requirement, the
court required the surviving spouse to bear the burden of showing
that the provision was not made in contemplation of marriage, rea-
soning that any devise to the surviving spouse in the antenuptial
will is prima facie a provision within the literal meaning of the
statute.45 The court also allowed the admission of extrinsic evi-
dence to establish that the testator had not made the devise in
contemplation of marriage to the devisee, though such evidence
was limited to circumstances existing at the time of the execution
of the will.46 In Ganier, Mr. Ganier met his burden of proof when
he offered uncontradicted testimony that he and Mrs. Kennedy
had not discussed marriage until long after she had executed her
will.47
2. The Equivocal-Intent Approach. In Estate of Christensen
v. Christensen,48 the Utah Supreme Court asserted that the pri-
mary purpose of section 2-301 is to effectuate the testator's intent,
not to protect the surviving spouse.49 Under this interpretation, de-
termining whether the devise in the antenuptial will was executed
in contemplation of marriage is simply a first, although potentially
dispositive, step in discerning the testator's intent.50
In Christensen, the testator, Clyde Christensen, and the peti-
11 Id. at 259 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.301 (West Supp. 1984)).
" 418 So. 2d at 261 (emphasis in original). California courts have adopted the same
justification for reading the contemplation-of-marriage requirement into that state's omit-
ted-spouse statute. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
45 418 So. 2d at 260.
41 Id. The general rulein cases where the surviving spouse is a beneficiary in the ante-
nuptial will is that only extrinsic evidence of the facts and circumstances at the time the will
was executed is admissible. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. This comment, how-
ever, proposes that evidence of extrinsic facts and circumstances subsequent to the execu-
tion of the will and of the testator's direct declarations of intent should be admitted, under
a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, when this evidence is relevant to the inquiry into
the testator's intent. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
7 418 So. 2d at 260.
1 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982).
1, Id. at 649-50.
50 Id. at 650.
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tioner, Virginia Thompson, had been neighbors since 1966. In
1976, Mr. Christensen executed a will devising most of his ten-mil-
lion-dollar estate to his granddaughter. In codicils executed in 1977
and 1979, he left Ms. Thompson shares of stock later valued at
$436,000. The couple married in 1980, and Mr. Christensen died
six weeks later. Ms. Thompson argued that Mr. Christensen's de-
vises of stock in the antenuptial codicils did not prevent an award
of the intestate share under section 2-301 because (1) these devises
were not made in contemplation of marriage and (2) their value
was too small in relation to the value of the estate to constitute a
testamentary provision for the surviving spouse. 1 The court
disagreed.
Although it recognized that the common law and prior stat-
utes had adopted a contemplation-of-marriage requirement, the
Utah Supreme Court refused to read this requirement into section
2-301 because "[i]n a statute so carefully drafted [as section 2-
301], th[e] omission [of a contemplation-of-marriage requirement]
must have been deliberate. '52 With contemplation of marriage
eliminated as the dispositive inquiry, the court concluded that the
petitioning spouse would have to "establish that the testamentary
gift specified before the marriage could not reasonably represent
th[e] testator's effort 'to provide by will for his surviving
spouse.' "53 This interpretation of section 2-301 rests on the as-
sumption that section 2-301 is designed to implement the testa-
tor's intent. To support this assumption, the court first noted that
the commentary to section 2-301 indicates that the section "'re-
flects the view that the intestate share of the spouse is what the
decedent would [have] want[ed] the spouse to have if he had
thought about the relationship of his old will to the new situa-
tion.' -54 In addition, the court -asserted that the choice of an intes-
tate share for the omitted spouse indicates that the primary pur-
pose of section 2-301 is to effectuate the testator's intent because
"it fairly approximates what the testator would have bequeathed if
he had executed a will after the marriage.'55
In determining whether the devise could "reasonably re-
51 Id. at 648-49.
52 Id. at 649. This argument assumes that the drafters of section 2-301 had in fact con-
sidered the problem of mentioned spouses in writing that provision. For a criticism of this
assumption, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
53 655 P.2d at 650 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-301 (1978)). Section 75-2-301 is
essentially identical to U.P.C. § 2-301.
655 P.2d at 648 (quoting U.P.C. § 2-301 comment).
B 655 P.2d at 650.
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present th[e] testator's effort 'to provide by will for his surviving
spouse,'" however, the court declined to adopt an approach that
focused solely upon the testator's intent. Although recognizing that
a testator could not have intended his surviving spouse to receive
the intestate share when a smaller devise was made in contempla-
tion of marriage, the court concluded that an inquiry into the tes-
tator's intent could not be dispositive in cases where the evidence
does not indicate whether the devise was executed in contempla-
tion of marriage: "[the testator] may simply have neglected to
amend his will after marriage, or he may have reexamined the will
and decided that his previous testamentary gift would adequately
provide for his new spouse. ' 56 The court did not conclude, how-
ever, that this ambiguity could be resolved by combining the ad-
mission of extrinsic evidence relating directly to the testator's in-
tent after the execution of the will with a corresponding allocation
of the burden of proof. Rather, the court would determine whether
the will had "provided for" the surviving spouse by examining such
objective, equitable factors as the amount of the devise (by itself
and in comparison with other devises under the will), the timing
and duration of the marriage, and the spouse's need.57 Although
such factors may be useful in discerning what the testator might
have wanted his spouse to have, they suggest that the court was
more concerned with what the spouse deserved to have, regardless
of what the testator actually intended. 58
66 Id.
57 Id. The court listed a total of eight nonexclusive factors that should be considered:
(1) the alternative takers under the will, (2) the dollar value of the testamentary gift to
the surviving spouse, (3) the fraction of the estate represented by that gift, (4) whether
comparable gifts were made to other persons, (5) the length of time between execution
of the testamentary instrument and the marriage, (6) the duration of the marriage, (7)
any inter vivos gifts the testator has made to the surviving spouse, and (8) the separate
property and needs of the surviving spouse.
Id.
58Many of the factors listed by the Christensen court may be useful in determining the
testator's intent at the time of, and subsequent to, the execution of the will. For example, a
substantial testamentary devise to the surviving spouse, a short period of time between the
execution of the will and the marriage, or substantial inter vivos gifts to the surviving
spouse might indicate that the testator had considered his marriage at the time the will was
executed or had reexamined his will after his marriage and intended it to remain intact. The
eighth factor-"the separate property and needs of the surviving spouse"-and the court's
statement that the evidence must show that the testamentary gift "could not reasonably
represent th[e] testator's effort 'to provide by will for'" the spouse suggest, however, that
these factors should be considered in determining whether the surviving spouse deserved
the intestate share, not in discerning the testator's intent either when the will was executed
or after the marriage.
Utah appears to be the only American jurisdiction that has adopted this method of
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II. ANALYSIS OF MENTIONED SPOUSES UNDER SECTION 2-301
The courts have developed two different approaches to the
problem of "mentioned spouses" under section 2-301. The Florida
Supreme Court, in Ganier, read a contemplation-of-marriage re-
quirement into its omitted-spouse statute, thus forbidding inquiry
into the testator's post-execution intent.59 The Utah Supreme
Court, in Christensen, adopted an approach that purports to focus
on the testator's intent, but which also includes consideration of
whether the surviving spouse deserved the intestate share in cases
where the devise was not executed in contemplation of marriage.6 0
Further analysis of section 2-301 and other provisions of the Code
will show that neither court's approach carries the inquiry into the
testator's intent far enough.
At first glance, section 2-301 appears to offer no help to sur-
viving spouses who are beneficiaries of antenuptial wills. The sec-
tion states that a surviving spouse is only entitled to the intestate
share if the testator "fails to provide by will for his surviving
spouse who married the testator after the execution of the will." 61
One could read this language to mean that any devise to the sur-
viving spouse in the antenuptial will "provides for" him, thus bar-
ring an award of the intestate share under section 2-301.62
This interpretation of section 2-301 would be odd, however,
determining whether a surviving spouse has been omitted, but the inquiry is similar to ele-
ments of the testator's-family-maintenance system in England. Under the Inheritance (Pro-
vision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975, ch. 63, English courts have the authority to
make "reasonable financial provision" for certain dependents, including the surviving
spouse, where "the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by his will or the law relat-
ing to intestacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is not such as to make reasona-
ble financial provision for the applicant." Id. § 1. In determining whether the testator has
made a "reasonable provision" for the surviving spouse, an English court considers such
statutorily prescribed factors as the nature of the decedent's estate, the surviving spouse's
personal wealth, and the conduct of the surviving spouse toward the testator. See id. § 3.
Although some commentators have advocated the adoption of this system in the United
States, see, e.g., Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Dece-
dents' Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 277, 277, 312-14 (1955); Plager,
The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV.
681, 682-83, 714-15 (1966), nothing in section 2-301 authorizes courts to consider equitable
factors.
", See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
60 See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
61 U.P.C. § 2-301(a).
62 In Estate of Ganier, 402 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Estate
of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1982), the court adopted this interpreta-
tion of section 2-301. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. A few courts have in-
terpreted other omitted-spouse statutes in a similar manner. See supra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text.
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because it neglects any consideration of the testator's intent in
making the devise, contrary to the stated underlying purposes of
the Code.13 Section 1-102 indicates that the Code should be inter-
preted so as "to discover and make effective the intent of a dece-
dent in distribution of his property"; 64 and section 2-603, a general
rule of construction covering intestate succession and wills, also
notes that "[t]he intention of a testator as expressed in his will
controls the legal effect of his dispositions."65 In light of this pur-
pose, a literal interpretation of section 2-301 would only make
sense if the drafters had consciously decided that any gift, however
trivial, would suffice to bar the spouse's petition. Had the drafters
of section 2-301 intended this result, however, they would have
used a less ambiguous term than "provided for. '66
It is more likely that the drafters designed section 2-301 to
address the common problem of an "unthinking" testator: a testa-
tor who executes a will that does not mention his surviving spouse,
then marries and forgets to change his will before his death. Sec-
tion 2-301 is designed to effect what the testator probably would
have done had he considered the problem created by his marriage
after the execution of his will. The commentary to section 2-301
emphasizes this purpose: the surviving spouse is entitled to the in-
testate share because this is "what the decedent would want the
spouse to have if he had thought about the relationship of his old
'3 Because the Code is "a general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject mat-
ter," U.P.C. § 1-105, and should "be liberally construed and applied to promote its underly-
ing purposes and policies," id. § 1-102(a), specific sections should be analyzed within the
context of the Code as a whole.
61 Id. § 1-102(b)(2). Section 1-102(b) also identifies four other basic purposes of the
Code: (1) "to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing per-
sons, protected persons, minors and incapacitated persons"; (2) "to promote a speedy and
efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his
successors"; (3) "to facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts"; and (4) "to make uni-
form the law among the various jurisdictions." Id. § 1-102(b)(1), (3)-(5).
6- Id. § 2-603.
" It should not be shocking that the drafters of section 2-301 failed to consider "men-
tion cases." It is unrealistic to attribute omniscience to the drafters of statutes: statutes are
intended to deal with general problems and cannot be expected to anticipate and resolve
every possible problem that could arise in their application. See, e.g., United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) ("inevitable incompleteness presented by all
legislation"); Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CM. L. REv. 800, 811-12 (1983) (imputing omniscience to legislatures is an "unrealistic
assumption" because "a statute necessarily is drafted in advance of, and with imperfect
appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application"); Note, Intent,
Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court,
95 HARV. L. REv. 892, 899 (1982) ("Congress' vision is not broad enough to consider all the
details of each general policy it enacts . . . .") (footnote omitted).
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will to the new situation. '67 Section 2-301 implements the testa-
tor's probable intent by presuming that the testator would have
wanted the surviving spouse to receive the intestate share if the
marriage occurred after the execution of a will that "fail[ed] to
provide for" the spouse.65 The section provides, however, that this
presumption yields to the testator's actual contrary intent when
the testator either (1) indicates in his will that his omission of his
surviving spouse was intentional or (2) makes inter vivos transfers
to his surviving spouse that were intended to be in lieu of a provi-
sion in the will. 69 Read as a whole, the section's presumption is
that a testator who makes a will, later marries, and then dies with-
out having either expressly disinherited his spouse or made an ex-
tratestamentary provision both did not think "about the relation-
ship of his old will to the new situation" and would have wanted
his spouse to have the intestate share if he had thought about his
will in light of the new situation.
87 U.P.C. § 2-301 comment.
63 Id. § 2-301(a).
69 Id. As it is written, section 2-301 does unnecessarily defeat the testator's intent in
one class of cases: where extrinsic evidence could show that the testator intended not to
make any provision for his surviving spouse, but he failed to indicate that fact in the ante-
nuptial will and did not make any inter vivos gifts in lieu of a testamentary provision. See
Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 497, 552 (1977)
(noting this exception). Section 2-301 operates when a testator "fails to provide for" his
surviving spouse in his antenuptial will. When there is no mention of the surviving spouse in
the antenuptial will, the use of the term "fails to provide for" is not ambiguous: it allows no
other interpretation than that the spouse has been omitted.
Although the language of section 2-301 defeats the intent of "purposeful" omitting tes-
tators, it is not clear that this reflects the drafters' deliberate choice of the appropriate
treatment for this class: the commentary indicates that the drafters had in mind unthink-
ing, not purposeful, omitting testators, see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. The
drafters may have considered purposeful omissions a de minimis category, not worth ad-
dressing specifically, or they may not have addressed this problem at all when drafting the
provision. It is useless to speculate at any length about the drafters' views because although
their intent may be unclear, the language of the statute is not.
That section 2-301 defeats testamentary intent in purposeful-omission cases does not
impugn the correctness of the testamentary-intent approach to "mention cases." Mention
cases cannot be lumped in with purposeful-omission cases because the section's language
does not clearly provide for the proper treatment of mention cases. Because the term "pro-
vide" is ambiguous, and could mean simple inclusion or something more substantial, see
WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1827 (unabr. ed. 1976) (the word "pro-
vide" is defined as "to make a proviso or stipulation," or "to supply what is needed for
sustenance or support"), mention cases are not clearly handled by the statute. That being
the case, this comment argues that a testamentary-intent standard better reflects the overall
purposes of the U.P.C., see infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text, and is in harmony
with the drafters' view that the testator unintentionally omitted the spouse, see supra notes
66-68 and accompanying text.
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The "plain meaning" interpretation,70 however, presumes that
decedent spouses of mentioned survivors have thought about the
relationship of the old will to the new situation. This interpreta-
tion would defeat the purpose of section 2-301 by creating a per se
rule that a petitioner may never be granted an intestate share of
the estate if the antenuptial will contains a devise (however small)
to him. For example, suppose that T executed a will devising a
small sum to his close friend S. Several years later, T marries S
and dies without revising his will or considering the effect of his
marriage on his old will. In this case, T indicated neither that he
intended S to receive the devise in his old will once the couple
married nor that he had even considered the effect that his subse-
quent marriage might have on his old will. Yet the "plain mean-
ing" approach would prevent the application of section 2-301 in
this situation. This result is inconsistent with the purpose of sec-
tion 2-301 because that provision is designed to award an intestate
share whenever the testator fails to consider the relationship be-
tween his marriage and his old will. Section 2-301 is not a rule of
law intended to defeat the intent of a decedent, but is instead a
subsidiary rule of construction designed to fill a gap in the ante-
nuptial will.
The gap-filling nature of section 2-301 suggests an alternative
interpretation of the provision, one consistent with both its pur-
pose and text. A testator cannot have "fail[ed] to provide by will
for his surviving spouse" if, after the marriage, he intended his sur-
vivor to receive only what was devised in his will. If this can be
proved to be the case, the testator's intent is clear, and section 2-
301, a subsidiary rule of construction designed to effectuate the
testator's probable intent, should not be used to defeat his actual
intent. If, on the other hand, the testator simply has not consid-
ered the relationship between his marriage and his will, the fact
that he executed a will containing a devise to his future spouse
should not prevent an award of the intestate share under section 2-
301. The proper inquiry in cases where the testator marries a bene-
ficiary of his will, then, is whether the testator thought about the
relationship between his marriage and his will and intended his
surviving spouse to receive the devise in his will.71
70 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
7' One commentator has argued that section 2-301 is intended to apply only if
the testator has not expressed a contrary intent, see Comment, supra note 23, at 867-68,
but the commentator failed to grasp the implications of this conclusion. Instead of recogniz-
ing that section 2-301 is a gap-filling mechanism that should not be construed to defeat the
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This "testator's intent" test is superior to the contemplation-
of-marriage 2 and equivocal-intent 3 approaches because it avoids
defeating the testator's actual intent in an important class of cases.
Although all three approaches reach the same result where the de-
vise in the antenuptial will was executed in contemplation of mar-
riage,7 4 the testator's-intent approach may reach a different result
where it can be shown that, though the testator did not execute his
will in contemplation of marriage, he later reexamined his will and
decided not to revise it. To illustrate this point, suppose that T
and S have been close friends since 1970. In 1975, T executes a will
devising a small sum of money to S and the residue of his estate to
his children by a prior marriage. At the time of the execution of his
will, T and S had not discussed marriage, but four years later they
decide to marry. After his marriage, T does not revise his will or
make any substantial inter vivos transfers to S. When his account-
ant asks him if he has thought about revising his will, he tells the
accountant that he believes that the devise in his will adequately
provides for S and that he wants his children to receive the bulk of
his estate. T dies in 1983, and S petitions for the intestate share
under section 2-301.75
In this case, the testator's-intent approach will reach a differ-
ent result from those that would be reached under either the con-
templation-of-marriage test or the equivocal-intent test. Since T
had not executed his will in contemplation of marriage to'S, the
testator's intent, the commentator advocated the adoption of the equivocal-intent approach
of the Utah Supreme Court, see id. at 868-75, which may defeat the testator's intent in an
important class of cases. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
74 Under the contemplation-of-marriage approach, only a devise proved to have been
executed in contemplation of marriage can prevent the application of section 2-301. In this
situation, the equivocal-intent and testator's-intent approaches also prevent the surviving
spouse from taking an intestate share under section 2-301: a devise executed in contempla-
tion of marriage establishes that the testator intended for his surviving spouse to receive the
devise.
75 Particularly in the case of a second marriage, a testator is likely to devise to his
surviving spouse a relatively small amount and give the bulk of the estate to children by a
previous marriage or to other relatives. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH
TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 535-36 (2d ed. 1978). The application of section
2-301 in this situation will often, contrary to the testator's intent, either prevent the other
devisees from receiving anything or will reduce their shares (because the application of sec-
tion 2-301 makes the spouse the primary beneficiary). This may have been the case in Es-
tate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1982), and Estate of Christensen v.
Christensen, 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982), but it is impossible to know because the supreme
courts of Florida and Utah failed to inquire whether the testator, after the marriage, in-
tended his surviving spouse to receive the devise in his will.
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contemplation-of-marriage test will allow S to receive an intestate
share under section 2-301. The equivocal-intent approach would
also allow an intestate-share award because (1) the dollar value of
the devise to S is small in both absolute terms and compared with
what T's children will receive; (2) the will was executed four years
before the marriage; (3) the marriage lasted for four years; and (4)
T did not make any substantial inter vivos gifts to S.76 Under the
testator's-intent standard, however, S is not entitled to the intes-
tate share: T had considered the relationship between his antenup-
tial will and his marriage and intended for S to receive what was
devised in the will.
In this hypothetical, the testator clearly intended for his sur-
viving spouse to receive only the devise in his will, yet the contem-
plation-of-marriage and equivocal-intent approaches ignore his in-
tent and give the intestate share to the surviving spouse. This
result only makes sense if section 2-301 is, at least in part, in-
tended to protect the surviving spouse. The purpose of that sec-
tion, however, is to implement the testator's probable intent, not
to frustrate the testator's intent by protecting the surviving
spouse.77 Moreover, spousal protection, unlike implementation of
the testator's intent,78 is not a basic purpose of the Code.7 9 Hence,
section 2-301 should not be construed to protect the surviving
spouse when that goal conflicts with the testator's intent.
A refusal to adopt either the equivocal-intent test or the con-
templation-of-marriage requirement in applying section 2-301 does
not mean that the interest in spousal protection cannot be satis-
fied. A surviving spouse who does not receive the intestate share
under section 2-301 may either take the testamentary devise or re-
nounce that devise and take an elective share under section 2-
201,80 which gives a surviving spouse a share in the decedent's es-
tate regardless of the testator's intent. The commentary to the
elective-share provisions expressly states that their purpose is "to
protect a spouse of a decedent who was a domiciliary against dona-
tive transfers by will and will substitutes which would deprive the
7' For a discussion of the factors considered under the equivocal-intent approach, see
supra notes 57-58.
7 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
75 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
7' The Code provides for the protection of the surviving spouse in special elective-share
provisions. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
80 U.P.C. § 2-201. For a discussion of the Code's elective-share provisions, see supra
note 5.
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survivor of a 'fair share' of the decedent's estate."'" Since the Code
contains a separate provision specifically designed to protect sur-
viving spouses, it is unnecessary to protect them-at the expense
of the testator's intent-either by applying section 2-301 to all sur-
viving spouses who were not provided for by devises executed in
contemplation of marriage or by engaging in an inquiry into
whether the surviving spouse "deserved" the intestate share.
III. APPLICATION OF THE TESTATOR'S-INTENT STANDARD
Because testamentary intent is the key to section 2-301, the
will should stand even if the testator did not contemplate marriage
when making the will, so long as he later exhibited an intention
that his will remain intact despite the intervening marriage. In or-
der to decide whether this is the case, a court must determine (1)
whether the testator did think about the "relationship of his old
will to the new situation," and (2) whether he wished his will to
remain intact. The proper application of the testator's-intent ap-
proach requires appropriate standards for allocating the burden of
proof and for the admission of extrinsic evidence bearing on the
testator's intent.
A. Allocation of the Burden of Proof
Omitted-spouse statutes similar to section 2-301 have gener-
ally been interpreted so as to place the burden of proof on the pro-
ponent of the will, not on the surviving spouse who received a de-
vise in the will. 2 One rationale for placing the burden of proof on
the proponent of the will rests on the assumption that the primary
purpose of omitted-spouse statutes is the protection of the surviv-
ing spouse. In order to protect the surviving spouse, courts have
required the proponent of the will to prove the existence of one of
the exceptions to revocation under the omitted-spouse statute. 3
81 U.P.C. art. II, pt. 2 general comment.
82 See, e.g., Estate of Duke, 41 Cal. 2d 509, 512, 261 P.2d 235, 237 (1953); In re
Snopek's Estate, 249 A.D. 396, 398, 292 N.Y.S. 359, 362 (1937), aff'd sub nom. In re Gross,
275 N.Y. 606, 11 N.E.2d 778 (1938); see also 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 603 (1975) ("The burden
of proof of acts invoking an exception to the rule of revocation by operation of law rests
upon him who asserts the exception."). But see In re Estate of Livingston, 172 So. 2d 619,
620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (because "provision by will" exception is "evident upon the
face of the will itself," mentioned spouse has the "burden of alleging and proving that such
will failed to provide for [him] as contemplated by [the statute]").
83 See, e.g., Estate of Duke, 41 Cal. 2d 509, 512, 261 P.2d 235, 237 (1953); In re Estate
of Paul, 29 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-97, 105 Cal. Rptr. 742, 747 (1972). Examples of the statu-
tory exceptions to revocation include: (1) an express provision in the antenuptial will that it
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Moreover, since these omitted-spouse statutes create a presump-
tion that the will should be revoked when the surviving spouse
marries the testator after the execution of his will,s4 the courts
have reasoned that the proponent of the will should have the bur-
den of proving that the will should not be revoked . 5
The supreme courts of Utah and Florida, however, have held
that section 2-301 places the burden of proof on the surviving
spouse who was mentioned in the antenuptial will. 6 Several argu-
ments support their allocation of the burden of proof. First, be-
cause the purpose of section 2-301 is not to protect the surviving
spouse but rather to implement the testator's probable intent
where he has not considered the problem created by his marriage
after the execution of his will,"7 it is unnecessary to place the bur-
den of proof on the proponent of the will in order to protect the
surviving spouse. Moreover, unlike omitted-spouse statutes that
create a presumption of revocation where the surviving spouse
shows that he married the testator after the execution of the lat-
ter's will,8 section 2-301 creates a presumption that a surviving
spouse should receive the intestate share only when he married the
testator after the latter's will was executed and when that will
"fails to provide for" the surviving spouse. 89 This suggests that in
addition to establishing that he married the testator after the exe-
cution of the latter's will, the surviving spouse should have to
prove that the antenuptial will did not "provide for" him.
Finally, section 3-407 of the Code provides that the contest-
ants of a properly executed will have the burden of proving its rev-
ocation. 90 This provision reflects the general rule that where the
will has been properly executed, courts will presume that it accu-
rately embodies the testator's intent and will put the burden of
was made in contemplation of marriage, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-76 (1982); (2) an agree-
ment by the spouse to waive any share in the testator's estate, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6561
(West Supp. 1985); and (3) mention of the surviving spouse in the will in such a way as to
show that the omission of the spouse was intentional, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.050
(West 1967).
84 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6560 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 35 (Mc-
Kinney 1919) (repealed 1967).
'5 See, e.g., Estate of Duke, 41 Cal. 2d 509, 512, 261 P.2d 235, 237 (1953); In re
Snopek's Estate, 249 A.D. 396, 398, 292 N.Y.S. 359, 362 (1937), aff'd sub noma. In re Gross,
275 N.Y. 606, 11 N.E.2d 778 (1938).
8" See Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256, 260 (Fla. 1982); Estate of
Christensen v. Christensen, 655 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1982).
'7 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 84.
s' U.P.C. § 2-301(a).
'o Id. § 3-407.
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showing otherwise on the party contesting the will.9' Although sec-
tion 2-301 does not expressly refer to a revocation of the antenup-
tial will, it does in effect operate as a partial revocation of the
will;92 accordingly, the rationale underlying section 3-407-that the
contestants of a properly executed will should have the burden of
establishing that it does not embody the testator's intent-requires
allocation of the burden of proof to the surviving spouse.
Placing the burden of proof on the surviving spouse has two
consequences. First, a surviving spouse who received a devise in
the antenuptial will bears the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the antenuptial will did not "provide for" him within the
meaning of section 2-301.93 Second, and more important, a surviv-
ing spouse bears the burden of producing evidence that the ante-
nuptial will failed to provide for him.94 If the antenuptial will does
not contain a devise to the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse
has established a prima facie case that he was not provided for in
the will, and the burden of production shifts to the proponent of
the will. When the antenuptial will does contain a devise to the
surviving spouse, however, the surviving spouse will have to pro-
duce evidence that the will does not "provide for" him. If the sur-
viving spouse presents evidence that the testator did not execute
the antenuptial will in contemplation of marriage, this evidence, if
believed, would establish a factual probability that the will did not
91 See, e.g., Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
489, 513 (1975) ("Proper compliance with the Wills Act, so-called due execution, is the basis
in modern law for certain presumptions which shift the burden of proof from the propo-
nents of a will to any contestants.").
92 The language of section 2-301 merely provides that "the omitted spouse shall receive
the [intestate share]," U.P.C. § 2-301(a), and does not expressly label this as a revocation of
the testator's will. One might consider the operation of section 2-301 not to be a revocation
because section 2-508 provides that "divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or ap-
pointment of property made by the will to the former spouse" and that "[n]o change of
circumstances other than as described in this section revokes a will." Id. § 2-508. The com-
mentary to section 2-508, however, suggests that the restriction of revocation to divorce or
annulment was intended only "to change the rule in some states that subsequent marriage
or marriage plus birth of issue operate to revoke a will" (i.e., the old rule of total revocation)
and was not intended to determine who should bear the burden of proof under section 2-
301. Id. comment. Whatever the drafters chose to call section 2-301, it does operate as a
partial revocation. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 7, at 399 (section 2-301 "in
effect permits a partial revocation of a will because of a change in circumstances").
93 U.P.C. § 3-407 ("Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters with
respect to which they have the initial burden of proof.").
" See EDWARD CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 951-52 (3d ed. 1984) (initial
burden of producing evidence is usually assigned to the party who bears the burden of
persuasion).
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"provide for" him within the meaning of the statute.e5 At that
point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the will
to show either that the devise actually was executed in contempla-
tion of marriage or that, though the parties had not contemplated
marriage when the will was executed, the testator reexamined the
will after his marriage and intended it to remain intact.
B. Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence
The allocation of the burden of proof to the surviving spouse
will determine the outcome of many cases in which the testator
marries a beneficiary of his will: the surviving spouse will be una-
ble to produce evidence rebutting the presumption that the devise
in the antenuptial will "provide[s] for" him, by showing that it was
not executed in contemplation of marriage. If such evidence is pro-
duced, however, it may be necessary to admit extrinsic evidence to
determine whether the testator had later considered the relation-
ship of his old will to the new situation and intended his spouse to
receive only the devise in his antenuptial will. For example, a sur-
viving spouse may want to establish that the devise in the will was
not executed in contemplation of marriage by showing that he and
the testator had not discussed marriage until long after the will
was executed."6 A proponent of the will, on the other hand, may
want to introduce evidence that the testator, after his marriage,
had told his accountant that he wanted his spouse to receive only
the devise in his antenuptial will. In such cases, a court must ex-
amine extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the testator's intent.
There are two main types of extrinsic evidence: (1) evidence of
facts and circumstances extrinsic to the will; and (2) the testator's
direct declarations of intent.9 7 At early common law, extrinsic evi-
" The vast majority of omitted-spouse situations probably involve "unthinking testa-
tors" (that class with whom the drafters of section 2-301 were concerned, see supra text
following note 66) rather than testators who think about the situation and decide that they
are satisfied with the original will as it stands. The contemplation-of-marriage approach also
presumes that most "mention cases" where the will was not executed in contemplation of
marriage are caused by an "unthinking testator": when a testator makes a will that includes
a devise to someone with whom he does not then contemplate marriage, it is more likely
than not that the testator would revise the will after marrying that person if he thought
about the relationship of the old will to the new situation. The presumption is made irrebut-
table, however, when that approach excludes extrinsic evidence about events occurring after
the execution of the will that would show that the presumption was erroneous in this case.
This leads to the defeat of the testator's intent in such cases.
" See, e.g., Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256, 260 (Fla. 1982).
97 See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 146, at 810 (distinguishing between the testa-
tor's direct declarations of intent and other forms of extrinsic evidence); M. RHEINSTEIN &
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dence could not be admitted to alter or vary the terms of a will,98
but courts soon created exceptions to this no-extrinsic-evidence
rule.99 At present, the general rule is that a party may introduce
evidence of extrinsic facts and circumstances (but usually not the
testator's direct declarations of intent'00) in order to place the
court "in the armchair of the testator"'' 1 or to cure an ambiguity
in the will.1o2 For example, a testator may misdescribe a piece of
M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 357-58 (same).
98 After the enactment of the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1 (1540), which allowed
the testamentary disposition of real property in certain circumstances, the courts initially
refused to admit extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of the will. See, e.g., Challoner's &
Bowyer's Case, 2 Leon. 70, 70, 74 Eng. Rep. 366, 366 (C.P. 1587); Brett v. Rigden, 1 Plowd.
340, 345, 75 Eng. Rep. 516, 525 (Q.B. 1568); see also JAMES THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREA-
TISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 396, 414-15 (1898); 9 JOHN WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE § 2470, at 224-25 (3d ed. 1940).
9" See J. THAYER, supra note 98, at 414-49 (describing the development of exceptions to
the no-extrinsic-evidence rule); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 98, § 2470, at 225-28 (same).
100 See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, §§ 60, 146, at 286-88, 810; 4 W. BowE & D.
PARKER, supra note 2, §§ 32.8, 32.9, at 259-60, 266-70; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 98, § 2471.
An exception to the general rule has been created where the will contains an equivocation, a
term that applies equally to two or more persons or objects. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra
note 3, § 60, at 287; 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 2, § 32.9, at 270-71; 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 98, § 2472, at 233. For example, a testator may have devised $40,000 to "my
nephew Joe" when he had two nephews with that name. In this case, the testator's direct
declarations of intent would be admissible to establish which nephew was intended to re-
ceive the devise. See, e.g., Money v. Money, 235 Ala. 15, 176 So. 817 (1937) (devise to
"brothers children"); Tinker's Estate, 157 Misc. 200, 283 N.Y.S. 151 (Sur. Ct. 1935) (devise
to a named hospital where two institutions with that name existed). In practice, an "equivo-
cation" is virtually identical to a "latent ambiguity." See infra note 102. Accordingly, courts
have generally admitted the testator's direct declarations of intent when the will contains a
latent ambiguity. See, e.g., Virginia Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 1030, 1034 (4th
Cir. 1971) (applying Virginia law); Breckner v. Prestwood, 600 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980). But see, e.g., In re Estate of Smith, 119 Ariz. 293, 296, 580 P.2d 754, 757 (1978)
(allowing the admission of testator's direct declarations of intent to cure patent as well as
latent ambiguities).
101 In re Estate of Houston, 414 Pa. 579, 585, 201 A.2d 592, 595 (1964).
102 See, e.g., R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, supra note 14, at 383; 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 98, §§ 2470-2472; Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the
Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 530 &
n.28 (1982). Latent ambiguities are not apparent upon the face of the will but only arise
when the terms of the will are applied to extrinsic circumstances (e.g., a devise to "Indian-
apolis Home for the Aged located at 2007 N. Capitol Avenue" when there are The Al-
tenheim Home of Indianapolis at that address and The Indianapolis Home for the Aged,
Inc., located at 1731 N. Capitol Avenue). These have historically been distinguished from
patent ambiguities, which appear upon the face of the will, as for example when provisions
in the will conflict. See 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 2, § 32.7, at 254-55. This
distinction can be traced back to Sir Francis Bacon, who argued that extrinsic evidence is
not admissible to resolve a patent ambiguity: "[A patent ambiguity] is never holpen by aver-
rement. . . because the law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the
higher account, with matter of averrement, which is of inferior account. . . ." FRANCIS BA-
CON. ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND 82 (London 1639). The distinction be-
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real estate in his will, so that when the will is probated it tran-
spires that the testator did~not own the land described in the will.
In order to resolve the uncertainty arising from this situation, a
court may admit evidence that the testator owned a similar parcel
of land otherwise fitting the testamentary description and not de-
vised to anyone else.103
The courts' primary objection to the admission of extrinsic ev-
idence is that it would violate an important purpose of the Wills
Act formalities of writing, signature, and attestation: 10 4 to provide
tween latent and patent ambiguities has been criticized severely, see, e.g., 4 W. BOWE & D.
PARKER, supra note 2, § 32.7, at 258 ("it undoubtedly would be a step forward in the devel-
opment of our law to discard the distinction entirely"); J. THAYER, supra note 98, at 422-25,
471-73 (characterizing the distinction as an "unprofitable subtlety"); 9 J. WmMORE, supra
note 98, § 2472, at 239 (criticizing it as "artificial"), and it probably has little effect today,
see, e.g., R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, supra note 14, at 373-74; Langbein &
Waggoner, supra, at 530 n.28. To the extent that it is recognized at all, it probably prevents
the admission of the testator's direct declarations of intent where there is a patent ambigu-
ity. See supra note 100.
Courts have recently begun to relax the no-extrinsic-evidence rule. See Estate of Taff,
63 Cal. App. 3d 319, 324-25, 133 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740-41 (1976); Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287,
291, 377 A.2d 892, 894 (1977); cf. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 98, §§ 2461-2462, 2470, at 187-
96, 224-28 (advocating the abandonment of the no-extrinsic-evidence rule). While purport-
ing to construe wills, courts have allowed the liberal admission of extrinsic evidence, includ-
ing the testator's direct declarations of intent. See, e.g., Taff, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 133
Cal. Rptr. at 741; Engle, 74 N.J. at 295-96, 377 A.2d at 896. For discussions of these devel-
opments, see Langbein & Waggoner, supra, at 555-62; Note, Ascertaining the Testator's
Intent: Liberal Admission of Extrinsic Evidence, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1349 (1971).
103 See, e.g., Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886) (where the will devised lot number six
in square 403, which the testator did not own, the Court admitted extrinsic evidence to
establish that the testator had intended to devise lot number three in square 406); Arnheiter
v. Arnheiter, 42 N.J. Super. 71, 125 A.2d 914 (1956) (similar); In re Will of Goldstein, 46
A.D.2d 449, 363 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1975) (similar), aff'd per curiam, 38 N.Y.2d 876, 382
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1976).
104 The various American statutes are largely derived from the Statute of Frauds, 29
Car. 2, ch. 3, § 5 (1677), which required devises of land to be in writing, signed by the
testator, and witnessed, and from the superseding Statute of Victoria, 7 Win. 4 & 1 Vic., ch.
26 (1837), which required that devises of real and personal property be in writing, signed by
the testator at the end of the document, and attested by two witnesses in the presence of
the testator. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 62, at 292. Some states impose additional
requirements, e.g., that the testator tell the witnesses that the instrument is his will, or that
the witnesses sign in the presence of each other. See generally Kossow, supra note 5, at
1369-77 (describing the statutory formalities required in various jurisdictions). Most states
have adopted statutes similar to the Statute of Frauds, see R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0.
BROWDER, supra note 14, at 129, and more than a quarter of the states have enacted U.P.C.
§ 2-502, which requires a "writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some
other person in the testator's presence and by his direction," and the signatures of "at least
2 persons each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the
signature or of the will," see 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983).
In addition to the evidentiary purpose, see infra note 105 and accompanying text, the
Wills Act formalities serve three other functions: (1) to warn the testator of the seriousness
and finality of a will; (2) to protect the testator against third parties who might seek to
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the court with reliable evidence of the testator's intent. 0 5 Because
a will is ambulatory, extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent can
only be presented when the testator is no longer available to sub-
stantiate or refute it. As a result, the testator's main protection
against mistaken or fraudulent evidence is judicial deference to a
will executed in compliance with statutory formalities designed in
part to ensure that the will accurately reflects the testator's
intent. 06
The general rule excluding extrinsic evidence has usually been
applied in cases involving a surviving spouse who received a devise
in an antenuptial will. With the exception of the Utah Supreme
Court, which admitted evidence of extrinsic facts and circum-
stances that arose after the execution of the will, 0 7 most courts
have only admitted evidence of extrinsic facts and circumstances
existing at the time the will was executed or soon after if it helps
explicate the testator's intent at execution. 08
deceive or coerce him; and (3) to standardize wills. See Langbein, supra note 91, at 492-97;
see also Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 5-13
(1941) (characterizing the purposes of the Wills Act in terms of the "ritual," "evidentiary,"
and "protective" functions).
105 See, e.g., 4 GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 20.1, at 157-58 (1978) ("If
effect were given to extrinsic evidence of such different intentions, there would be a very
real danger that the testimony would be fraudulent or at least mistaken. It is the very dan-
ger that brought about the enactment of that part of the statute of wills governing disposi-
tions.") (footnotes omitted); Langbein, supra note 91, at 492 ("The primary purpose of the
Wills Act has always been to provide the court with reliable evidence of testamentary in-
tent."). Because extrinsic evidence has been admitted in a wide variety of circumstances,
see, e.g., Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 102, at 529-54 (discussing the various exceptions
to the no-extrinsic-evidence rule), some commentators have suggested that the real objec-
tion to its admission is its technical noncompliance with the Wills Act. See id. at 522-23,
528-29, 566-77; id. at 555 ("When the circumstances are such that mistake can be remedied
without overtly supplementing the attested language of a will, the courts have confidently
admitted and evaluated extrinsic evidence of mistake .... The real barrier to a general
reformation doctrine for mistaken wills has not been the evidentiary problem . . . but the
problem of achieving technical compliance with the Wills Act.").
'" See, e.g., R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, supra note 14, at 367;
Langbein, supra note 91, at 492.
107 Estate of Christensen v. Christensen, 655 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1982) (discussed
supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text).
108 See, e.g., Estate of Ganier v. Estate of Ganier, 418 So. 2d 256, 260 (Fla. 1982); In re
Estate of Day, 7 Ill. 2d 348, 354-55, 131 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1955); cf. In re Estate of Bent, 142
Misc. 811, 813-14, 255 N.Y.S. 538, 541-42 (Sur. Ct. 1932) (evidence of extrinsic facts and
circumstances is admissible when the will refers to the surviving spouse by name but not
when it refers to him in a different status such as "my friend"). But see Estate of Poisl, 44
Cal. 2d 147, 150, 280 P.2d 789, 792 (1955) (extrinsic evidence is not admissible where the
antenuptial will contains a devise to the surviving spouse). Recent developments in Califor-
nia may have reduced the significance of the court's refusal in Poisl to admit extrinsic evi-
dence. See supra note 102.
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Limiting the admissible evidence to extrinsic facts and circum-
stances existing at the time of execution of the will,10 9 however,
will sometimes result in the grant of the intestate share under sec-
tion 2-301 even though the testator intended his surviving spouse
to receive only the devise in his will.110 Such a limitation would
preclude, for example, evidence that the testator reexamined his
will after his marriage and did not change it, even though such
evidence would indicate that the testator had considered the rela-
tionship between his marriage and his will and that he wanted his
surviving spouse to receive only what was devised in the will. More
important, the general rule prevents the admission of the testator's
direct declarations of intent, which are even more likely than ex-
trinsic facts and circumstances to indicate what the testator in-
tended."' For example, evidence that, after his marriage, the testa-
tor told his accountant that his will already provided for his
surviving spouse and that he therefore did not intend to revise his
will would clearly indicate that he had intended his testamentary
scheme to remain intact after his marriage.
To the extent that the admission of extrinsic evidence
presents a danger of mistaken or fabricated testimony, this prob-
lem can be handled by the creation of appropriate evidentiary
safeguards.1 1 2 First, in determining whether the testator intended
his surviving spouse to receive the devise in his will, courts should
"' Commentators have disagreed about the usefulness of evidence of extrinsic facts and
circumstances that arose subsequent to the execution of the will. Compare McGovern, Facts
and Rules in the Construction of Wills, 26 UCLA L. REV. 285, 286 (1978) (arguing that such
evidence is "often [a] more reliable guide[] to intent than the words used in the will"), with
4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 2, § 30.8 ("[s]ubsequent events cannot be considered").
ISo Section 2-301 is a subsidiary rule of construction and should not be applied when
the testator intends the spouse to receive only the devise in the will. See supra notes 67-71
and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 98, § 2471, at 229 (testator's direct declarations
of intent are useful in determining his intent). Moreover, admission of extrinsic evidence of
the testator's intent in these circumstances does not pose the danger of remaking the will
contrary to the testator's intent because the purpose of the admission is to uphold the will
by avoiding a statutory rule of implied revocation. See id. § 2475, at 248-49 ("the ascertain-
ment of the actual intent. . ., including the testator's circumstances and declarations ...
has long been the practice in dealing with the artificial rules of presumption as to. . . revo-
cation of a will by marriage, and it is capable of application to any general and artificial
rule of inference") (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
112 In advocating a reformation doctrine for mistakes in wills, two commentators have
suggested that procedural safeguards would adequately address the evidentiary concerns
present in the admission of extrinsic evidence when the testator cannot confirm or deny the
evidence. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 102, at 577-79. They proposed that extrinsic
evidence should be admitted to reform a mistake in a will where the error (1) affected a
material provision in the will; (2) involves a fact or event of particularity; and (3) satisfies
the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. See id.
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admit extrinsic evidence under a clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard of proof.1 13 This standard addresses the same evidentiary
concerns that prompted the creation of the no-extrinsic-evidence
rule (by testing extrinsic evidence against an exceptionally high
standard of proof), but it avoids preventing the admission of relia-
ble evidence of the testator's intent.114 Second, extrinsic evidence
should be admitted only if it is relevant to the key inquiries: (1)
whether the testator considered the "relationship of his old will to
the new situation," 1 5 and (2) whether he intended his surviving
spouse to receive only what was devised in the antenuptial will.
This limitation would help reduce the danger of abuse that is pre-
sent whenever interested parties testify.
Section 2-301 itself supports the admission of extrinsic evi-
dence of the testator's intent. In order to determine whether a tes-
tator intended inter vivos transfers to replace a testamentary pro-
vision, section 2-301 provides that the testator's intent may be
"shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of the
transfer or other evidence." 1 6 The Code's refusal to adhere to the
no-extrinsic-evidence rule in this case suggests that extrinsic evi-
dence should also be admitted in the closely related case (that the
drafters overlooked) where the testator marries a beneficiary of his
antenuptial will.
A more liberal admission of extrinsic evidence will not greatly
increase the burden on probate courts or unduly delay the probate
of estates. The high standard of proof and the limited nature of
the inquiry will deter surviving spouses from bringing spurious ac-
tions and proponents of wills from contesting genuine claims.17
113 The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard has frequently been applied where
there is a danger that extrinsic evidence may be fraudulent or mistaken. See E. CLEARY,
supra note 94, § 340, at 960-61. For example, courts have admitted and tested extrinsic
evidence of mistake in inter vivos transfers against this standard. See Langbein & Wag-
goner, supra note 102, at 525-26; Palmer, Reformation and the Parol Evidence Rule, 65
MICH. L. REV. 833, 847 (1967). This test has worked well in the case of inter vivos transfers
because the courts have enforced it vigorously. See, e.g., In re Estate of Duncan, 426 Pa.
283, 293-94, 232 A.2d 717, 722-23 (1967) (reversing lower court that allowed reformation of
instrument amending inter vivos trust because evidence of mistake was not clear and con-
vincing); In re Estate of LaRocca, 411 Pa. 633, 643, 192 A.2d 409, 414 (1963) (similar).
114 Although the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard cannot be defined with preci-
sion, it falls between the preponderance-of-the-evidence test normally used in civil litigation
and the beyond-reasonable-doubt rule in criminal law. See E. CLEARY, supra note 94, §§ 339-
341 (describing the weight of evidence necessary to meet each standard).
"' U.P.C. § 2-301 comment.
"6 Id. § 2-301(a).
17 Cf. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 102, at 586 (adoption of a reformation doc-
trine that allows the admission of extrinsic evidence will not increase the amount of strike-
[52:481
The "Un-omitted" Spouse
Moreover, the allocation of the burden of proof to the surviving
spouse will dispose of most "mention cases" without an extensive
factual inquiry. More restrictive rules of evidence than those pro-
posed in this comment would simplify and expedite probate ad-
ministration of "mention cases," but only at the cost of defeating
the testator's intent, the very purpose that section 2-301 is in-
tended to promote.
CONCLUSION
This comment has examined the problem of whether a surviv-
ing spouse who received a devise in an antenuptial will has been
"provided for" within the meaning of section 2-301. Because sec-
tion 2-301 is a rule of construction designed to operate only when
the testator has failed to consider changed circumstances (not a
rule of law that operates regardless of the testator's intent), the
proper inquiry in cases where a testator marries a beneficiary of his
will is whether the testator continued to intend that his surviving
spouse receive only what was devised in his antenuptial will. To
implement this approach and to minimize evidentiary concerns
and administrative difficulties, the burden of proof should be allo-
cated to the surviving spouse, and extrinsic evidence should be ad-
mitted, under a clear-and-convincing evidence standard, when it is
relevant to the inquiry into the testator's intent.
Mary Ellen Kazimer
suit litigation because "[t]he clear-and-convincing-evidence standard would impose too on-
erous a burden of proof upon the proponent of a spurious claim").
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